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Pros
 Post-socialist countries continue to experience low 
total fertility despite costly pronatalist policies.
 The motherhood wage penalty likely reduces 
fertility.
 The motherhood wage penalty can explain the 
ineffectiveness of baby bonuses.
 Policy measures to decrease the motherhood 
wage penalty may be better alternatives than baby 
bonuses, which will also reduce the gender pay gap.
 Ongoing institutional changes in post-socialist 
countries are likely to increase the motherhood 
wage penalty in the future.
Cons
 It is complicated to compare estimates of the 
motherhood wage penalty due to methodological 
differences.
 Direct tests of the motherhood wage penalty’s 
effect on fertility are not feasible.
 More direct evidence is needed on the 
effectiveness of alternative policies in reducing the 
motherhood wage penalty.
 Evidence on the role of institutional factors mostly 
comes from developed and only a few post-
socialist countries.
ELEVATOR PITCH
The motherhood wage penalty denotes the difference in 
wages between mothers and women without children 
that is not explained by differences in human capital 
characteristics and labor market experience. As part of the 
gender pay gap, the motherhood wage penalty can represent 
a significant cost to being female and having children. If 
ignored, it may undermine policy initiatives aiming to 
increase fertility rates in post-socialist countries, such as 
the costly “baby bonus,” which is a government payment to 
new parents to assist with the costs of childrearing.
KEY FINDINGS
AUTHOR’S MAIN MESSAGE
The motherhood wage penalty represents a significant share of the gender pay gap and cannot be ignored when 
considering policies targeted at women. The current strategy in many post-socialist countries of offering so-called 
“baby bonuses” to increase fertility is not working. Alternative policies aimed at reducing the motherhood wage penalty 
may prove more effective: for example, publicly provided childcare and moderate length parental leave combined with 
a campaign to promote cultural support for maternal employment.
Gender pay gap by presence of children for 
workers aged 25–44
Source: OECD. Closing the Gender Gap: Act Now. Paris: OECD Publishing, 
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MOTIVATION
Negative population growth and population aging are some of the most pronounced 
manifestations of the demographic changes that began in post-socialist countries in 
the early 1990s. These changes jeopardize these countries’ economic growth and raise 
concerns about the sustainability of their pension systems. Although a number of factors 
are at play, low fertility seems to be the only one that has attracted the attention of 
policymakers. The “baby bonus” (BB), a government payment to parents of a new born 
baby or an adopted child, has been utilized as a policy response to this demographic 
challenge, despite its cost and little evidence of its effectiveness. This indicates that 
women and their families face other factors aside from direct costs of childrearing when 
making decisions about having children. 
The motherhood wage penalty (MWP), which serves as a summary measure of a 
mother’s position in the labor market relative to non-mothers (i.e. women without 
dependent children), is a clear candidate. Targeting a decrease in the MWP via provision 
of quality public childcare and reducing prejudice against working mothers may represent 
a more effective tool than the current BB method; furthermore, doing so would have the 
additional benefit of decreasing the overall gender pay gap. However, the development of 
such alternative measures requires a comprehensive approach to account for a host of 
potentially conflicting influences related to current institutions and cultural norms as well 
as ongoing societal developments in post-socialist countries (e.g. strengthening the rule 
of law and increasing the retirement age).
DISCUSSION OF PROS AND CONS
Declining fertility rate and baby bonuses
Since the start of the transition period, all former socialist states have been going through 
significant demographic changes, resulting in negative population growth, skewing their 
overall demographics toward old age. These demographic changes are due to several 
reasons, including, but not limited to, net emigration, health crises (which have been 
especially deep and long-lasting in post-Soviet countries) and declining fertility rates 
(Figure 1). Such demographic trends have been raising concerns among policymakers, 
particularly with respect to possible consequences for countries’ economic development, 
as well as the sustainability of their pension systems [1]. Migration patterns are mostly 
driven by individual economic and well-being considerations and difficult and expensive 
to deal with directly, especially in the absence of state control over the movement of 
people. Addressing population health crises requires a comprehensive approach, careful 
planning, and considerable resources, with political dividends unlikely to materialize 
during the office term of any single ruling government. Thus, a number of post-socialist 
countries have chosen to address the issue of low fertility by devising pronatalist policies, 
which, in spite of being costly, are very popular among the electorate and bring immediate 
political dividends. These policies aim to offset the cost of raising children, thereby 
encouraging childbearing.
Many post-socialist countries have instituted BBs. They are usually not means-tested, but 
can be conditioned on other factors, such as parental citizenship and/or purpose (e.g. 
used toward the child’s future education, housing, or health care). Information on the 
cost of these policies is difficult to collect, primarily because the responsible government 
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agencies are not willing or able to provide it. For OECD countries, the Family Database 
documents direct cash transfers to children (including the BB), with the amount ranging 
from 0.8% of GDP in Poland to 2.2% in Hungary in 2011 (Figure 2). In Ukraine, the amount 
spent on the BB program constituted around 40% of their social assistance budget in 
2010. Russia budgeted RUB 344.5 billion for its national BB program to stimulate fertility 
in 2015, which constituted around 2% of GDP. Columns 2 and 3 in Figure 2 provide an 
illustration of BB sizes in the post-socialist countries for which information is available. 
As seen, it varies considerably, with the highest compensation levels observed in Hungary, 
Russia, and Ukraine.
There are no rigorous systematic studies on the effectiveness of such policies in this 
region. An analysis of the general trends in fertility following the introduction of the BB 
(Figure 3) may be misleading, as these trends may include effects of other demographic 
factors and policies. For example, very large BB levels in Ukraine and Russia instituted 
over the period 2008−2012 have indeed been followed by a slight increase in the total 
fertility rate. However, this period also coincided with the generation of Soviet baby 
boomers born in the 1980s finishing education and starting families. Therefore, the 
observed increase in total fertility may simply reflect this generation’s decision to have 
children to take advantage of generous policies. Such shifts in the timing of births will 
not lead to higher rates of completed fertility in the future, because they are not having 
more children, but rather having their children earlier. Moreover, the increases in total 
fertility are so small that they are unlikely to justify the high overall cost of the BB 
program.
There are only two studies in the literature that rely on a quasi-experimental setup for 
assessing the causal effects of similar BB policies. The data come from Canada and 
Israel [2], [3]. The Canadian case shows an increase of 16.9% in fertility in response to 
Figure 1. Total fertility rates in post-socialist countries
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Notes: Data about baby bonus policies have been collected according to the most recent available information since 2011. 
n/a = not available.
Source: OECD Family Database. Online at: http://www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm. Figures for Russia 
calculated based on data from http://tass.ru/obschestvo/1697611 and http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp. 
Figure 2. Amount and conditions of baby bonus payments for selected countries
Country % of 
GDP in 
2011
Baby bonus amount Conditions
Czech Republic 1 CZK 13,000 (US$545) lump-sum. First-born child of low-income 
mothers only.
Estonia 1.9 Variable (up to US$1,560 per month 
for a year).
Valid for 435 days, calculated 
based on the average monthly 
earnings of the previous fiscal 
year.
Hungary 2.2 Allowances for families: HUF 12,000 
(US$42) per month, per child; from 
2015 a non-repayable aid package 
of HUF 10 million (US$36,000) for 
the third child plus a loan of the same 
amount.
Allowance is not means-tested; 
the aid package should be 
allocated to an apartment 
purchase or house construction.
Lithuania n/a 1,400 Litas (US$460 lump-sum). Every child has the right to the 
benefit.
Poland 0.8 PLN 1,000 (US$260) lump-sum; 
from 2016, PLN 500 per month 
(US$125).
Means-tested at PLN 800 
parents’ combined monthly 
income.
Russia 2.1 RUB 250,000 (US$9,400)  
lump-sum.
For every child after first-born. 
Can only be spent on housing, 
education, health care, or 
mother’s pension.
Slovakia 1.6 Lump-sum payment to cover 
necessities following a child’s birth.
Additional annual payment to 
parents of triplets.
Slovenia 1.7 €280.75 lump-sum payment. n/a
Sweden 1.5 SEK 1,050 (US$117) per month for 
each child under the age of 16.
n/a
UK 2.6 £1,076 (US$1,354) per year for the 
first child (£712 (US$896) per year for 
each subsequent child) for 16 years (20 
if in full-time education) plus one-off 
payment of £500 (US$629) for a first-
born (or for multiple birth) if one of the 
parents is on certain welfare benefits.
Only applicable if neither of 
the parents earn more than 
£50,000 (US$61,950) per year.
Ukraine n/a UAH 41,280 (US$1,720: provided as 
a US$430 lump-sum, with the rest 
distributed equally over three years).
For any child (starting 2015 
based on means test).
a US$1,000 increase in the BB [2]. The Israeli study finds a consistently positive effect 
from the child subsidy on having a third child among families with two children, with 
the strongest effect documented for poor families (the study was not able to evaluate 
possible effects on first and second births due to the BB structure) [3]. Comparing these 
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findings to those that suggest a small effect of income on fertility, the authors of the latter 
study suggest that only the policies affecting the price of an additional child are likely to 
be effective, while those that affect income in general are unlikely to have an impact on 
fertility. Interestingly, throughout the considered period both Canada and Israel had been 
experiencing a positive trend in fertility, which continued even after a significant reduction 
in the amount of child subsidies in both countries in 2003.
While these studies provide compelling causal evidence for the BB effect on fertility in 
two countries, the lack of evidence on substantial increases in fertility rates following 
the introduction of BB policies in other countries indicates that there is an unaccounted 
factor that works toward reducing fertility while not being (fully) compensated for by 
the BB. One obvious candidate is the gap in hourly wages between mothers and non-
mothers, i.e. the MWP, which depends on the number of children and may be different 
for each additional child.
Why the motherhood wage penalty can reduce fertility
Since the MWP is the remaining difference between wages of mothers and non-mothers 
after accounting for differences in human capital and working experience, there are 
three reasons that can explain its existence: mothers’ preferences for jobs with special 
amenities (e.g. working part-time or flexible hours), their lower job productivity relative 
to non-mothers, and discrimination resulting from stereotyping mothers (i.e. statistical 
discrimination).
With respect to the first two factors, the evidence on a significant role of preferences 
is limited [4], [5], and only a few studies focusing on the productivity explanation 
Note: Baby bonus was introduced in Russia in 2007; Ukraine in 2008; and Hungary and Poland in 2016.
Source: World Development Indicators. Online at: http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi
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produce the opposite findings. One study does find that the differences among wages 
of professional sportswomen with and without children are driven by reductions in 
productivity [6]. On the contrary, the other studies find no significant difference between 
mothers and non-mothers in academia in terms of the number of publications as a 
measure of productivity [7], [8]. Overall, the truth may lie somewhere in between—with 
some decreases in productivity occurring depending on the combination of physical and 
intellectual components in any given job.
By contrast, the discrimination argument, which refers to the connections between 
the MWP and employer discrimination in hiring, training, pay, and career tracks, does 
find much stronger support within the literature. Due to the stereotypical expectations 
on the burdens imposed by families on mothers’ time and energy, employers engage 
in discriminatory practices against mothers. A number of laboratory experiments and 
audit studies have shown that female workers identified as mothers were appraised as 
less competent than non-mothers. Moreover, pregnant female managers were considered 
less competent and less qualified for promotion than non-pregnant ones. Job applicants 
identified as mothers were consistently ranked as less competent and less committed, with 
smaller shares of them being recommended for either hire, promotion, or management 
training, and in cases when they were recommended for hire, mothers were offered lower 
starting salaries. At the same time, evaluators posed higher requirements toward them 
(e.g. permitting fewer late days and demanding higher scores on exams) [9]. Moreover, 
in-depth interviews with employers in the financial sector in Hungary identified “specific 
strategies that employers use to shed, demote, and marginalize mothers who are 
professional workers,” which is consistent with the discrimination narrative [10].
There is significant variation in estimates of the MWP across countries. One can distinguish 
four groups [11], [12]: (i) countries where mothers’ wages are practically the same as 
that of non-mothers (Australia, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Sweden); 
(ii) countries with a small documented penalty of 5–9% (Canada, France, Poland, and 
Slovakia); (iii) countries with moderate MWP of 10–19% (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Russia, Spain, Ukraine, the UK, and the US); and (iv) countries with very large penalties of 
20% or greater (Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands).
As higher MWP effectively translates into lower wages for mothers, it makes sense to go 
back to economic theory and recall how women’s wages affect fertility decisions. Basic 
economic theories suggest that higher wages have two effects on fertility: an “income 
effect” due to the expansion of a family’s budget, and a “substitution effect” because of 
an increased opportunity cost of having children. The income effect predicts that, with 
higher wages, women would choose to have more children, while the substitution effect 
says that women with higher wages lose relatively more in income for every hour that they 
divert from work to childbearing and caring responsibilities, and thus would choose to 
have fewer children. Given the fact that childcare is a time-intensive activity performed 
mostly by women, it is reasonable to expect that the substitution effect will dominate; 
thus, higher wages would be associated with lower fertility. Empirical research into this 
question has been limited; that which exists has arrived at mixed results, which have been 
reconciled by a recent study from Norway. This study finds that the substitution effect 
dominates with respect to the effect of wages on the likelihood of first birth, while the 
income effect dominates when considering the likelihood of second and third births [12]. 
In other words, higher wages decrease a woman’s likelihood of having a first child, but 
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increase her likelihood of having a second and third child. Another recent theoretical study 
shows that the income effect is likely to dominate when housing comprises a sufficiently 
significant cost of child rearing [13]. For instance, if having more children implies incurring 
higher costs for additional housing, and if housing is in limited supply and/or very 
expensive, then other costs of child rearing, such as the opportunity cost of the mother’s 
time, become less important. Therefore, when housing costs are high, increases in wages 
will have a positive effect on fertility.
Despite the lack of empirical evidence, there are two reasons to believe that (higher) wages 
will positively impact fertility in post-socialist countries, thereby implying that the MWP 
has a negative effect on fertility. First, the documented decline in fertility is often linked 
not to the unwillingness to have children per se, but to decisions about whether to have 
more than one child. The second reason is the historical and ongoing shortage of good 
quality affordable housing, which is often mentioned among the top three impediments 
to having children by respondents in various surveys.
Institutions and cross-country variation in the motherhood wage penalty
Considerable variation in the documented magnitude of the MWP across countries has 
inspired research into the role of institutional and cultural factors. It has been found that 
the MWP is affected by policies that target mothers’ labor market attachment, such as 
moderate-length maternity leaves, publicly funded childcare, lower marginal tax rates on 
second earners, and paternity leave; these policies are all correlated with smaller MWPs. 
One study also indicates that an interaction exists between institutional characteristics 
and cultural norms: maternity leaves and public childcare are more effective at reducing 
the MWP when combined with cultural norms that support maternal employment. 
However, these types of policies may turn out to be counterproductive if cultural support 
for maternal employment is low, potentially resulting in higher MWP [11].
The post-socialist countries are located toward the lower end of the MWP distribution 
spectrum, ranging from small (in most post-socialist EU member states) to medium (e.g. 
Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine). This is not what would be expected given 
the existing institutions in post-socialist countries: The MWP levels seem to be too low for 
countries with long maternity leaves and negative attitudes toward maternal employment 
and too high for countries with high provision of public childcare. Figure 4 shows that 
the percentage of those people who think that children suffer when their mother works in 
post-socialist countries is usually higher than in Germany, which has the highest measured 
MWP, at 33%, among all the countries for which estimates are available.
There are two possible explanations for such a phenomenon. The first is the quality of 
the legal environment. Although most post-socialist countries have modern legislation 
prohibiting discrimination and promoting family-friendly practices at work, widespread 
corruption within the courts has made it virtually impossible for workers to defend their 
rights against employers. So, de facto, these countries have quite lax labor markets, 
where employers do not bear any responsibility for discriminating against mothers and/
or pregnant women. This is often manifested by employers requiring that women provide 
them with an undated resignation letter at the start of work, which can then be used 
by the employer if they become pregnant. This situation essentially nullifies the implicit 
mechanism by which any cost of maternity mandates (however long they may be) is 
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transferred to those entitled to the benefit via lower wages, because employers are in fact 
not bound by these mandates, as women are unable to protect their rights in courts.
The second explanation is related to cultural norms that favor significant involvement of 
grandparents in the provision of childcare, age discrimination in labor markets against 
women older than 45, and relatively early retirement ages. These conditions imply that 
alternative high-quality childcare provided by grandparents is more likely to be available 
to mothers in post-socialist countries than in Western countries, which makes it easier 
for mothers to focus on work and thus have higher productivity. Based on the available 
evidence, both explanations should work toward lowering the MWP.
Positive developments may negatively impact the motherhood wage penalty
Many post-socialist countries are currently undergoing a series of necessary and long 
overdue reforms. These include strengthening the rule of law and restructuring their 
pension systems. Despite the obvious need for these developments, there are serious 
concerns that they may unintentionally lead to increased MWPs. The former would 
increase the real cost of maternity leave to employers and reduce the scope for age 
discrimination in the labor market, while the latter would inevitably increase the statutory 
retirement age. Increasing employers’ costs of providing maternity leave could lead to 
stronger prejudice against women with children. Similarly, curtailing age discrimination 
Note: Percentage of respondents to the World Values Survey from 2010 to 2014 who agree or strongly agree with 
the statement: “When a mother works for pay, children suffer.”
Source: Nizalova, O., T. Sliusarenko, and S. Shpak. “The motherhood wage penalty in times of transition.” Journal of 
Comparative Economics 44:1 (2016): 56–75.
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and increasing the retirement age would decrease the availability of grandparents to 
provide childcare, thus increasing the opportunity costs of having children.
However, there is no apparent discussion among policymakers about these possible 
negative impacts on the MWP. In tandem with the much-needed institutional reforms, 
policy measures should be considered to reduce the MWP.
LIMITATIONS AND GAPS
The evidence on the MWP and its relationship to fertility is fragmented and should thus 
be treated with caution. With this in mind, there are several other important limitations 
that must be mentioned.
First, exploring the direct effect of the MWP on fertility may never be possible. This is 
because the MWP represents a summary measure of mothers’ position in the labor market, 
estimated at the country level, which means that the data have to satisfy extremely high 
requirements in order to estimate the MWP magnitude. These requirements make it very 
costly to obtain results at a reasonable frequency to obtain sufficient longitudinal data 
needed for rigorous statistical analysis, while cross-country studies will inevitably face the 
problem of endogeneity.
The second limitation involves the focus on post-socialist countries. There is only a limited 
number of studies estimating the MWP that adhere to sufficient methodological standards 
required to identify causal effects. This is primarily due to the absence of panel data with 
rich information on labor market participation in these countries. Therefore, most of the 
evidence is drawn from literature focusing on developed countries and is then applied to 
the post-socialist setting.
Finally, studies considering the role of institutional factors in explaining cross-country 
variation in the MWP should be updated to make use of a more advanced panel data 
structure that allows for estimation methods leading to less biased results.
SUMMARY AND POLICY ADVICE
Given current levels of female labor force participation, any policy measures to increase 
fertility, such as BB, will not be effective if they ignore the presence of the MWP. Studies 
exploring the possible causes for the significant variation in the MWP across countries 
point to a certain combination of institutional and cultural factors that could potentially 
lead to a lower MWP. However, ongoing and much-needed reforms in post-socialist 
countries, such as strengthening the rule of law and increasing the retirement age, 
could end up increasing the MWP. These reforms are inevitable and positive in many 
respects, yet no discussion currently exists in policy circles about any unintended negative 
consequences on the MWP, and, by extension, on the overall gender pay gap and fertility. 
Despite limited empirical evidence on the topic, that which does exist is quite consistent; 
as such, it should not be ignored in policy debates and should serve as a basis for further 
exploration into the MWP and fertility issues.
To avoid an increase in the MWP, countries should improve the quality and availability of 
publicly provided childcare and/or create an attractive business environment for private 
initiatives in this sector. Additionally, extensive maternity leave (up to three years in 
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many countries) should be cut to more moderate levels of approximately one year. These 
two steps should be carried out in combination with the promotion of cultural norms 
supporting maternal employment.
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